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3ABSTRACT
This study experimentally investigates the value of cost report accuracy in an
interactive pricing context. Market agents received feedback about their own profits via either
a volume-based costing or a more accurate activity-based costing report.  They also received a
typical market report containing the performance of their rivals. While prior work suggested
that market discipline and learning from salient competitors can overcome performance
decrements due to inaccurate costing, our results imply that the corrective nature of market
feedback depends on the decision maker’s role in the competitive play. Compared to other
participants, decision makers endowed with the role of a ‘reputational’ market leader are less
effective in screening available market feedback because they predominantly fixate on their
own cost data. Even when receiving biased volume-based costing, reputational leaders ignore
valuable market signals of opponents having access to more accurate cost data. Consequently
other market players can take advantage of them.
4INTRODUCTION
Whether it is worthwhile for a firm to invest in the accuracy of cost data depends to a
large extent on its ability to ‘read’ the feedback emanating from its rivals’ actions and results
(Briers et al. [1999], Vives [1990]). The more effectively managers can filter useful decision
inputs from market feedback, the less sensitive their decisions will be to the quality of their
own cost reports. Very little research however has examined the factors affecting managers’
ability to use market feedback, and infer information about their own costs (Narayanan
[2003]). We propose that one such factor is the beliefs decision makers hold about the
competitive reputation of their firm in the market.  More specifically, we propose that
‘reputational’ leaders, defined by Scherer [1980, 177] and Cooper [1996] as a leading firm
with a strong reputation without having a significant market power or cost advantage, will be
less sensitive to market feedback than followers, and more dependent on the quality of their
own cost reports.  To address this issue, we studied how decision makers use cost reports and
competitor feedback in a competitive pricing game.  Market agents played against each other
to maximize their profits. Market feedback was available to all players by displaying price
choices and profits of their rivals. We manipulated for each player whether they received high
accuracy (ABC-based) or low accuracy (volume-based) cost reports, and whether they
believed to be leaders or followers in the market.
Our results show that the mere assignment of a role in competitive play had a large
impact on sensitivity to informative market feedback. Participants who believed to be
reputation leaders, tended to be biased towards exclusive use of their own cost reports. Even
when their system produced distorted cost data, they underutilized informative market signals,
and were taken advantage of by better-informed rivals. In contrast, participants assigned to the
follower role, were able to capitalize on the feedback from well-informed rivals, and used
their own cost data only to extent that market feedback was uninformative.
Our research presents a contribution to both academic and practitioner literature. First,
we extend prior research by demonstrating the value of ABC in a more natural multi-period
competitive pricing context. Secondly, while prior literature tends to favor market discipline
as an alternative for cost system choice (Waller, Shapiro and Sevcik [1999]), our results
suggest an important limitation to this position. Decision makers will be less sensitive to
valuable market signals when they believe to be a ‘reputational’ leader. In practice, leadership
beliefs are often instilled by organizational culture on a firm’s marketing and financial
managers, who tend to make the pricing decisions (Sherer [1980]). Those firms should
5therefore always consider following the practitioner’s advice to refine their costing system
(Cooper and Kaplan [1998]), as they will otherwise be vulnerable to targeted actions by better
informed rivals.
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Research on the role of cost system accuracy for decision-making is slowly expanding
from individual decision settings (Ashton [1976], Hilton, Swieringa and Turner [1988],
Briers, Luckett and Chow [1997], Gupta and King [1997]) towards more competitive market
settings (Callahan and Gabriel [1998], Waller, Shapiro and Sevcik [1999], Krishnan, Luft and
Shields [2002]). A unique feature of competitive markets is that they provide decision makers
with feedback about the actions of their rivals (Waller et al. [1999]). Whether decision makers
can effectively use this feedback to make inferences about their own costs, such that they do
not have to invest in more accurate costing, however remains debatable [Narayanan, 2003]).
Waller et al. [1999] have argued that markets foster learning from superior market
rivals, reducing the bias to fixate on cost accounting data that has traditionally been observed
in monopolistic settings (Ashton [1976], Briers et al. [1997], Turner and Hilton [1989], Gupta
and King [1997]). Waller et al. [1999] tested the effects of variable versus absorption costing
when sellers made competitive price offers. The differential impact of the costing system
quickly disappeared in markets because participants learned from more successful sellers.
Briers et al. [1999] studied decision making with biased volume-based costing in a pricing
task where superior market feedback was available. Their task did not directly involve any
direct competition nor did they study ABC. Nevertheless, they showed that subjects could
effectively use competitive benchmark reports to improve pricing decisions way beyond when
they would have solely fixated on their biased cost system. Similar as to evidence in financial
accounting research (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe [1995]; Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson
[2002]) these studies argue that market discipline can often correct for biases in pricing due to
cost-system inaccuracies. Following this principle, ABC may not always be beneficial for
price setting, because market agents with biased cost data can learn from better-performing
rivals. Analytical work of Vives [1999] also comports with the view that agents benefit from
observing better-informed market agents under price competition.
This view sharply contrasts with the general practitioners’ argument that cost system
accuracy is especially valuable in competitive contexts (Hanson, [1998]). Cooper and Kaplan
[1998] argue that agents with access to ABC will outperform agents that continue to rely on
6less refined costing systems. In fact they assume that decision makers with biased costing data
would still fixate on cost systems, and ignore valuable signals of a better-informed rivals
using ABC.  Cardinaels, Roodhooft and Warlop (2004) directly investigated this assumption
experimentally, and found only one exception to pricing behavior dominated by market
discipline.  When volume based costing reported unusual losses for a generally profitable
market, certain participants stopped using informative market signals from a computerized
rival. Overall, results were still highly dominated by market discipline. This exception raises
the question whether there exist ‘fundamental’ environmental factors inducing market agents
to systematically neglect informative market feedback. If such factors would exist, there are
still strong incentives to invest in ABC in competitive settings.
To explore this issue, we performed a direct test of whether less-informed decision
makers with biased cost data can learn from better-informed rivals with access to more
accurate ABC when they play against each other in an interactive multi-period pricing
duopoly 1. Compared to prior studies, we also performed a fairer and ecologically more valid
test. It is hard to disregard market feedback when it is based on explicitly presented
benchmarks of optimal behavior (Briers et al. [1999]; Cardinaels et al. [2004]) or when
successful sellers attract all sales (Waller et al. [1999]). We therefore study a differentiated
duopoly with residual sales for both players. In fact, we compared asymmetric information
scenarios – in which one player received an ABC report while the other player received
traditional volume based costing – with symmetric scenarios where both parties received
either ABC or volume based costing. Neither participant knew the other party’s cost system.
They only received a market report with the rival’s profit and price choices and had to decide
whether the other party’s prices constitute a valuable signal for their own decisions.
Our main proposition is that the emotional correlate of finding oneself in the leader
position in our duopoly (as opposed to the follower role) may lead to market agents being less
sensitive for market signals. In experimental economics, Camerer and Lovallo [1999]
documented underutilization of market signals from competitors, which they labeled as
‘reference group neglect’. In their study, participants were more likely to disregard their rivals
in market entry decisions, when they had voluntary signed up for a task that stated their
                                                  
1 To our knowledge we are one of the few to introduce human competitors by focusing on the dynamic interplay
between participants in a multiple period pricing task in two heterogeneous markets. In general, prior research on
cost information in competitive settings, often assumes simpler one-period models (Callahan and Gabriel,
[1998], Krishnan et al. [2002]) or introduces “computerized” market feedback (Cardinaels et al. [2004])
sometimes even without any interaction (Briers et al. [1999]). The study of Waller et al. [1999] involves human
competitors, but cost allocation was not an issue, because they used a simpler setting with one product, while we
introduce multiple markets.
7performance largely depended on their own skills. The under-utilization of competitor data
resulted into excess entry, with inferior decision performance (Camerer and Lovallo [1999]).
Unlike Camerer and Lovallo [1999], we do not explicitly induce our participants to
focus on their own skills.  Rather, we argue that different roles in our duopoly may guide
attention to either internal or external market information. In our experiment, we informed
players that historically their firms had acquired the reputations of either ‘barometric’ leaders,
or followers. Barometric leaders are defined as firms that do not have a significant market
power or cost advantage, but having acquired a reputation to respond more quickly to market
conditions, serve as a barometer for other market agents (Cooper [1996] and Sherer [1980]).
We predict that by being assigned to a leadership role, participants adopt an ‘inside
perspective’ (Kahneman and Lovallo [1993]). It leads decision makers to focus on their own
abilities and the case material at hand (e.g. own cost report), without effectively screening the
data of other parties. It can be triggered by various numbers of factors (Kahneman and
Lovallo [1993]) and we expect that identification with a ‘reputational’ leader may be such a
factor that induces decision makers to ignore their competition. In practice, leading firms
indeed underestimate competing rivals (Roll [1986]), and often expect other market agents to
accommodate (Haskel and Scaramozizino [1997, 41]).
If leaders neglect market feedback, they may act like decision makers in monopolistic
settings, and exhibit a similar bias to fixate on the cost report (Ashton [1976], Gupta and
King, [1997]). This will not create a disadvantage as long as they use accurate costing data
(Gupta and King [1997]). However, if their own system produces biased cost information, we
expect that the leader’s performance will generally be lower, even if there is opportunity to
learn from a competitor with access to more accurate cost data (follower with ABC). In
contrast to prior predictions based on market discipline (Vives [1990]; Waller et al. [1999]),
we therefore predict that less informed leaders will not benefit from receiving competitor
feedback of a better-informed rival. Consequently, we predict that the leader’s performance is
dominated by the accuracy of his own cost information:
H1: “Leaders improve prices and profit performance only if their own cost report
provides more accurate cost data (irrespective the type of market feedback).”
For participants in the follower role, the relationship between their own cost report and
competitor feedback is different. Followers are less prone to ignore competitor feedback.
Similar to arguments made by Briers et al. [1999] and Waller et al. [1999], we argue that the
follower’s own cost information is redundant when there is an opportunity to learn from
8better-informed rivals. Hence, when rivals have better cost data (leaders using ABC), we
expect market discipline to prevail, indicating that even followers with biased cost reports can
improve prices and profit performance by imitating price choices of their better-informed
competitor. However unlike in previous research (Briers et al. [1999]), the followers in our
study may also face less informed rivals. Will those followers still rely on market feedback
rather than their cost reports? Coughlan and Mantrala [1992] suggest that it is difficult to filter
out irrelevant market feedback in competitive plays. Less-informed rivals are less appropriate
benchmarks (Frederickson [1992]) but this may be difficult to infer when followers
themselves use biased cost data. However, Iselin [1996] argues that more relevant cost data
help decision makers filter out irrelevant feedback. Under ABC, followers do have relevant
cost data that may help them to realize that rivals are less-informed about costs. We therefore
predict an interaction between the followers’ own cost data and competitor feedback, such
that a followers’ cost system will be redundant for improving performance when their rivals
receive accurate cost data but not when rivals are less informed about cost:
H2:  “Differences in the accuracy of the follower’s cost report will not affect price
and profit performance when the follower’s rival receives accurate cost data
but matter when the rival receives less accurate cost data.”
While the preceding hypotheses tested whether and when market agents are guided by
market discipline or fixation on their cost reports, our third hypothesis directly compares
profit performance of leaders vis-à-vis followers in the experiment. While performance is
expected to be similar when both parties have the same cost data and likely to be higher when
those data are ABC, it is more interesting to focus on the asymmetric duopolies where only
one party has access to accurate ABC-data while the other party has not (Vives [1990]). We
will test the relevance of the practitioner’s claim suggesting that market agents maintaining
less refined cost data will be outperformed by market players using better ABC-data (Kaplan
and Cooper [1998]). Bloomfield, Libby and Nelson [1999] showed that investors are
outperformed by other investors when they have an informational disadvantage, especially
one of which they are not aware. Because leaders are more prone to reference group neglect,
they will probably be less aware of an information disadvantage emanating from followers
having superior cost data. In line with the reasoning of Bloomfield et al. [1999] we predict
that followers with ABC are able to outperform a less-informed leader. At the same time, we
assume that leaders with ABC will be less able to outperform followers with less accurate cost
data, since followers eliminate this cost disadvantage by taking in to account the actions of a
9better-informed leader. The practitioner’s argument of vulnerability to targeted actions by
market rivals using ABC particularly applies to the less-informed leader, because he will
mistakenly focus on biased cost signals, as he is unaware of opportunities to learn from
market feedback.
H3a: “Unlike the less-informed follower, only the less informed leader will be
outperformed by its better-informed rival in asymmetric duopolies.”
H3b: “Performance is similar across agents when both use the same cost data.”
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experimental market environment
Participants competed on prices in two market segments, denoted by A and B, in
which another participant acts as their rival. Market segments were Von Stackelberg
duopolies with differentiated demand functions (e.g. products with different brand names, see
Callahan and Gabriel [1998]) whereby one participant acted first assuming the role of the
leading firm (firm i), while their counterpart acted as follower (firm j). In Panel A of Table 1
the demand function for the leading firm is given by equation (1),  where Qis is the quantity
demanded for the leading firm in market segment s, and Pis and Pjs are the price charged by
respectively the leader and the follower in market segment s. Parameter us (>0) represents the
demand at zero prices. Parameter vs is set higher than ws (vs, ws > 0) in order that the firm’s
own price effect is more dominant than the competitor’s price effect2. Parameters are
displayed in Panel A of Table 1.
We note that leadership is not defined as cost leadership, as both the leading firm and
its follower faced a similar cost function. The actual cost function for each firm is defined as a
second degree of output and is given by equation (2). Parameters are chosen such that the
market segments are highly heterogeneous in the costs they incur. Table 1 shows that market
A is a high cost-to-serve market because it has a much higher fixed cost (parameter f) and
because costs increase more sharply as output (sales) increases (parameters y and z). The
quadratic cost function was chosen to ensure that volume-based costing, mistakenly assuming
                                                  
2 Similar as in Callahan and Gabriel (1998) this resulted in a differentiated demand duopoly (e.g. differences in brand name).
In such a duopoly a market players would be left with residual demand and profits if the rival would charge lower prices.
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a volume relation between sales and costs, results in more biased cost data compared to ABC
(as discussed later).
Subjects were to maximize their profits by differentiating prices across market
segments, given the price choices of the other firm. Profit functions for the leader and the
follower are displayed in equations (3) and (4) in panel B of Table 1. They can easily be
derived from the demand and cost functions in equation (1) and (2). The Nash-equilibrium is
derived by backward induction and is displayed by equations (5) and (6). Due to important
differences in costs, market A required a much higher price than market B at equilibrium in
order to recover these costs.
This section only described the background of the game. None of this information was
revealed to the participants. As discussed in the next sections, participants actually received,
besides outcome feedback (total realized profit), an imperfect cost report and a market report
containing prices choices and total realized profit of their competitor.
 Insert Table 1 About Here
Experimental factors
Three factors were manipulated between subjects. The first factor was the ‘role’
subjects played in the duopoly. They were assigned either the role of the leading firm or the
role of the following firm. In order to induce barometric price leadership (Scherer [1980]), the
leading firm was described to both players as a firm that sets prices first, due to fact that it had
built up a strong reputation and brand name in the past. The follower firm was described as a
firm that recognized this leadership and therefore only acted after the leader had made his
price choices. We explicitly told participants that both firms faced similar cost structures,
suggesting that leadership was not achieved through cost leadership, but merely via
reputation.
The second factor was the ‘own cost information’. After determining prices,
participants received not only total outcome feedback but as shown in appendix A they were
also issued one of two cost reports that sharply differed in the degree of accuracy of allocating
cost and profits to market segments. Reports were based on either traditional (biased) volume
based costing (VBC) versus more accurate activity based costing (ABC). Under VBC,
marketing costs were assigned to market segments using sales volume as a driver (Selnes,
[1992]). This driver failed to capture the actual cost-to-serve differences among markets,
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resulting into biased cost allocations across market segments (see appendix A). Conversely,
an ABC report assigned marketing costs on the basis of a two-step procedure (Kaplan and
Atkinson [1998]). In the first step marketing costs were assigned to three marketing activities.
In the second step, ABC allocated the cost of each activity across market segments using their
respective activity drivers (number of orders, software licenses, and deliveries). Rather than
assuming a volume-relationship, ABC assumed that market A required much more activities
than market B, rendering it per unit more costly to serve. Appendix A shows that resulting
ABC figures were closer to actual cost-to-serve variations among market segments3.
‘Competitor feedback’ was manipulated as a third factor. Because participants played
against each other they could either receive feedback from a competitor having access to more
accurate cost information (ABC), or a competitor using VBC reports. It is important to note
that participants did not know which cost system their opponent received nor were they made
aware of possible differences in cost systems among parties. After each decision they only
received the competitor’s price choices for market A and B and his realized overall profit.
Nevertheless, their rival faced a similar price setting task and through a series of plays
participants could learn whether or not the rival was as a useful benchmark (Frederickson
[1992]).
As indicated by Table 2, our design had four types of experimental duopolies, each
with different information structures. Duopolies of type 1 and 4 had a symmetric information
structure since both the leader and the follower received either biased VBC or more accurate
ABC reports. Type 2 and 3 duopolies were characterized by asymmetric information since
either only the follower, or only the leader had access to the more accurate cost information.
Initial prices were set to the same starting values for all four duopolies. In each duopoly,
participants viewed an initial cost report (either VBC or ABC) and a market performance
report of their rival before commencing their task. The task was performed over 10
consecutive trials. The details of the procedure are described in the next section.
Insert Table 2 About Here
                                                  
3 ABC is still a far from perfect cost report (Christensen and Demski 1995) since costs are assigned using drivers
that are linear with respect to output (appendix A), while the actual cost function is non-linear. However ABC-
drivers recognize that market A significantly requires more resources.
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Participants and experimental procedures
Participants -on average 23 years old is het hier niet de mediaan? Hoe kom je anders
uit op een rond getal?  - were recruited from various management accounting courses. All had
a university degree and completed a masters program in Accounting, Insurance, Applied
Economics, or Industrial Management. Their various courses had dealt with ABM issues such
as applying ABC for price differentiation among customers or market segments. In total 116
students participated in the experiment. The task was performed on a computer. Each session
lasted for 90 minutes and contained an even number of participants ranging from 8 to 16
students.
When entering the computer lab, participants were randomly assigned to one of the
four duopolies either as leader or follower. Subjects were widely spread across the room and
no oral communication of any kind was allowed during the session. In addition, it was
impossible to figure out with whom they were competing since they could not observe the
other players’ screens. In order to induce motivation, participants were told that the best eight
players- with the highest overall profit - would receive a 20 € gift coupon exchangeable
against CD’s4. Before starting the experimental task, subjects read a few instruction screens
about the case company and their task. The case company represented an importer of portable
computers for a particular brand. All subjects explicitly received prior cost knowledge on the
two heterogeneous market segments in which the company operated; They were told that
customers in market A were more demanding with respect to ordering, delivery and software
requirements. Instruction screens mentioned that subjects would play against a competing
distributor of a different brand, operating in the same two market segments facing similar cost
structures. Participants in the leadership role were explicitly told that they would act for a
leading firm with a strong brand name and reputation. Followers represented the other firm,
described as firm that recognized this leadership. They only acted when the leader had
announced his price choices5.
The subjects’ task was to maximize profits by setting new selling prices for PC’s
within each market segment. To provide opportunity for improvement, the starting prices
were not in line with the cost-of-serving (the price for market A was much lower than for B,
                                                  
4 In reality we rewarded the best player in each of the eight experimental cells with a coupon. Average profit was
taken as a reward, in order to discourage participants from taking risky decisions in particular trials. McIntyre
and Ryans (1983) used a similar compensation scheme.
5 We also introduced different brand names. The leading firm was labeled as ‘Toshiba’ whereas the following
firm was ‘Acer’. Pretests indicate that Toshiba is generally believed as a firm having a stronger reputation.
Details of the instructions and task are available on author’s request.
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while market A was in fact more costly)6. As a consequence of reputation, the leader would
choose prices first. The follower moved second and determined his or her own price choices
after observing the price choices of the leader. Next, markets cleared and both players
received an updated cost report (either based on VBC or ABC) and a report on their
competitor’s price choices and his realized total profit. This procedure was repeated for ten
trials. Throughout the experiment, price choices and profits of the last five trials for both the
own and the rival’s firm remained on the screen. After finishing the task, participants received
an exit questionnaire to assess their task motivation7. Motivation was high (mean of 4.29 on a
5-point scale). Importantly, no motivational differences were detected for the role (F(1,108):
0.16; p>.68) the own cost system (F(1,108): 2.02; p>.15) the competitor’s feedback (F(1,108):
0.18; p>.67) and any of its interactions (all p’s >.16).
Manipulation checks
The exit questionnaire further probed the participants’ perceived use of the different
feedback conditions (own cost information versus competitor feedback). We tested whether
our manipulation of ‘reputational’ leadership made participants being more prone to the
phenomenon of ‘reference group neglect’ (Camerer and Lovallo [1999]). Compared to
followers, leaders rated the price choices of the competitor as less important (F (1,108): 24.45;
p<.01) and used this information to a lesser extent (F(1,108): 20.83; p<.01). Moreover, when
evaluating the two feedback sources against each other, participants acting as leaders
evaluated their own cost information much more important than competitor feedback (F(1, 108):
20.82; p<.01). Leaders also considered their realized profit performance much more important
for improving their price choices (F(1, 108): 3.09 p<.09), suggesting that they attach strong
importance to the outcomes of their own actions. From these results we can conclude that
unlike followers, participants acting as leaders develop a sort of ‘inside perspective’, whereby
they are more inclined to neglect feedback from other market players (Camerer and Lovallo
[1999]).
                                                  
6 Initial price in each duopoly equaled PA=1650 and PB =1710 for the leader; and PA =1645 and PB =1706 for
the follower. A price bracket between € 1200 and € 2100 was established to ensure that quantity demanded
remained positive, given the rival's price choice.
7 The exit questionnaire also assessed the subjects’ subjective experience of sensitivity to the behavior of the
other player.  These results are discussed below.
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RESULTS
Effect of feedback on decision performance
In this section, we analyze how the participants learned to improve their decisions
based on the different kinds of feedback they received. Participants could have based their
decisions on their own costing system (either ABC or VBC). On the other hand, they may
have considered the price choices and the realized performance of their competitor, who in
turn used a particular cost report (ABC or VBC). Therefore the factors ‘own cost system’
(OS), ‘competitor feedback’ (CF), and their interaction are considered as explanatory
variables of decision performance. In addition, participants would probably improve decision
performance as they gain experience in the task (Gupta and King [1997]). Hence, experience -
reflected by the trial number T - was included as a control variable. Since we expected
differential effects of these feedback types according to the subject’s role in a duopoly, the
influence on decision performance was analyzed separately for leaders and followers in the
experiment.
We tested several metrics of decision performance. First, we considered the realized
profit of a participant in each trial (realized p). In addition, we tested how far a participant’s
profit would have been removed from the expected optimum (Panel B of Table 1) when the
other party would have set optimal prices (%dev_p). Besides profits, we also tested the
distance of the participants price choices of their theoretical optimum given the other party is
expected to play optimal (%dev_price). Compared to realized profit, the latter two metrics8
have some advantages. They take into account that leaders at equilibrium realize slightly
lower profits than participants acting as followers (see table 1). By setting the other party’s
prices to expectations, the unique effect of a participant not playing according to expectations
is singled out.
                                                  
8 Deviation metrics were defined as follows. For participants in the leader role we assumed prices of the follower
in each trial to be based on the expectations in panel B of Table 1 (PA = 1834.4; PB=1337.3). We recalculated
the leader’s profit that would have been realized based on these expectations and we tested how far this profit
was removed from the theoretical maximum profit for the leader (Optimal firm profit for leader= 777215.8;
Table 1). For the price metric we took the percentage deviation of the leader’s prices choices from optimal prices
of the leader (Pa=1848.2; Pb=1348.0; Table 1) again assuming equilibrium prices on part of the follower. Given
that prices above and below the theoretical optimum are possible, the absolute deviation is taken:
%Dev_p = (Profit Leader given expectations of the follower– 777215.8)/777215.8
%Dev_P = abs (PA Leader – 1848.2)/1848.2 + abs (PB Leader – 1348.0)/1348.0
We follow the same reasoning for participants acting as follower. As such, deviation metrics for the follower
take into account that followers can realize slightly more profits than leaders:
%Dev_p = (Profit follower given expectations of the leader – 790998.0)/790998.0
%Dev_P = abs (PA Leader – 1848.2)/1848.2 + abs (PA Leader – 1348.0)/1348.0
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The three regression models were tested for leaders (role=0) and followers (role=1)
separately. Because of evidence of serial correlation, coefficients were estimated using the
Yule-Walker method to correct for serial order correlation in the data:
Model 1:    Realized pit = b0 + b1 OS + b2 CF + b3 OS*CF + b4 T  + e
Model 2:    % dev_pit = b0 + b1 OS + b2 CF + b3 OS*CF + b4 T + + e 
Model 3:    % dev_Pit  = b0 + b1 OS + b2 CF + b3 OS*CF + b4 T + + e
with realized pit, % dev_pit and % dev_Pit, the metrics of decision performance for
each participant i in trial t; with OS the own cost system (OS=1 for ABC, 0
otherwise); with CF the competitor feedback (CF=1 if the competitor uses ABC, 0
otherwise); T = trial 1, 2,…, 10.
Panel B of Table 3 displays the regression results for the participants acting as
leaders. Since trial T was significant in all models we can conclude that leaders improve as
experience is gained in the task (Gupta and King [1997]). More interesting are the effects of
the different feedback conditions. In all three models only the main effect of the participant’s
own cost system (OS) was significant. Neither competitor feedback, nor its interaction with
the cost system was significant. As predicted by H1, the leader’s performance is dominated by
the accuracy of the own cost system. Their tendency to rely on their own costing data leads to
underutilization of useful market feedback. The means in Panel A of Table 3 and the graph
indeed show that leaders, even those using volume-based costing, learn little from a better-
informed competitor using accurate ABC-data (Compare CF=VBC with CF=ABC when
leader receives VBC). Rather than being guided by market discipline (Briers et al. [1999];
Waller et al. [1999]), reputational leaders in a duopoly exhibit similar cost fixation biases as
observed in monopolistic settings (Ashton [1976]). In sum, H1 is supported 9.
Insert Table 3 About Here
                                                  
9 We performed several robustness checks. One could argue that leaders (and followers) receive feedback from
rivals only when trial one has been completed. This may provide rational for leaving out prices choices of the
first trial. Results did however not alter when leaving out the first trial. In addition we also tested a deviation in
which the participant’s performance was compared against the maximum profit that could have been realized if
he actually would knew the other parties price choices. Results were similar again. However we think that
deviation metrics using expected prices of an opponent which are reported in Table 1, are more appropriate,
because participants acting as leaders can only anticipate expected prices of their opponent.
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Panel B of Table 4 shows the regression results for participants in the follower role.
As did the leaders, followers increased their performance over time, since trial (T) is
significant in each model. The main effects of the own cost system (OS) and competitor
feedback (CF), and their interaction, are all significant in the models with absolute profit and
the deviation against optimal profit as dependent variables. The significant interaction term
suggests that the follower’s own cost system becomes redundant when feedback is received
from a competitor using accurate cost data but not when this competitor used biased cost data.
This finding strongly supports H2. When comparing the means of both profit metrics, Panel A
of Table 4 confirms that followers learn from their better-informed leaders. When their leader
receives ABC (CF=ABC) followers perform better through market discipline, reducing the
effect of the own cost system (Waller et al. [1999]) But when their competitor receives biased
volume based costing (CF=VBC), the own cost system does matter again.
For the model with the deviation from optimal prices we did not find a significant
interaction. Only main effects were significant. The main effect of competitor feedback still
suggests that followers were guided by market discipline because they improved prices even
further when their competitor received ABC. Unlike the profit models, this superior feedback
from a better-informed leader, however, did not significantly reduce the effect of the
follower’s own costing system for price setting. Given the robust interactions10 of the profit
models we are inclined to suggest that the follower’s own cost system matters less when their
rivals uses ABC.
Insert Table 4 About Here
The performance of leaders against followers in each duopoly type
This section analyzes whether participants in a particular role (either leader or
follower) can take advantage of (outperform) their competing party (H3). We need to focus on
profits effectively realized by leaders vis-à-vis those of followers because deviation metrics
assuming optimal behavior of the rival, do not allow for such tests. The regression below
checks for each type of duopoly whether the ‘role’ significantly explains variations in realized
profits. Similar to previous models we included trial as a control variable and parameters are
estimated via the Yule-Walker procedure:
                                                  
10 For followers, we performed the same robustness checks as for leaders. Leaving out the first trial or testing
other deviation metrics did not alter the reported interactions in the profit models.
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Realized p =  b0 + b1 Role + b4 T  + e
In duopolies where both parties hold the same information we do not expect any
difference (duopoly type 1 and 4). Differences in profits are expected when only one of the
parties has an informational disadvantage as opposed to the other party (type 2 and 3). We
will first concentrate on these duopolies. Panel A of table 5 shows that in a duopoly of type 2,
the variable role is significant suggesting that followers with ABC are able to outperform
leaders relying on VBC. Presumable, leaders are outperformed because, by fixating on biased
cost data and neglecting important market feedback, they are less aware of their informational
disadvantage (Bloomfield et al. [1999]). The figure shows that followers with ABC take
advantage of their leader in each trial. Conversely, in a duopoly where leaders have more
accurate ABC data, followers with VBC are not outperformed, because they are able to follow
up market signals through market discipline. The figure (duopoly type 3) shows that while the
leader with ABC outperforms the follower in the first trial, he or she is unable to maintain this
advantage in subsequent trials. Hypothesis H3a, suggesting that only less-informed leaders are
vulnerable to being outperformed by rivals using ABC, is supported. Hence, leaders have a
big interest in refining their cost system to remove this informational disadvantage.
Further analyses in Panel A of Table 5 indicate, that the variable ‘role’ is not
significant when both parties are equally well informed (both use ABC or VBC). H3b is thus
supported11. Interestingly, in the duopoly in which both players have only access to biased
volume based costing (Type 1), the effect of trial is not significant. In this setting participants
do not learn via experience. This may indicate that the game was sufficiently complex (Roth
and Erev [1995]), as learning through outcome feedback is apparently not achieved under
VBC. More accurate data by one of the parties is an important enabler for learning.
Insert Table 5 About Here
                                                  
11 We note, however, that followers realize slightly more profits then leaders, to be precise a follower’s profits
are 101.77% of that of a leader at equilibrium (790998.0/777215.8), which is due to the fact that follower
actually moves second. However we can preclude that followers would simply realize more profits, because they
move second. Such an effect would always persists, especially in symmetric scenario’s (Type 1 and 4), but it was
not observed. To completely rule out this interpretation, we performed a robustness check, whereby we
artificially augmented the leader’s profit with the above percentage. Results remained robust, only in a type 2
duopoly, participants acting as follower outperformed their leaders.
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Additional analysis: information assymmetries and market performance
In Panel B of Table 5 we further analyzed differences in the realized market profit
achieved by both participants across various duopoly types. First of all, ABC leads to
significantly higher market profits when at least one of the parties has access to ABC (Type 2,
3 and 4 have higher market profits compared to Type 1). Interestingly a duopoly of type 3
where only the leader has access to ABC performs similar as to a duopoly where both parties
use ABC (type 4). This suggests that the follower using VBC behaves as if he receives ABC,
suggesting that followers are guided by market discipline (followers learn from rivals with
access to ABC). Significance levels in panel B of Table 5 further indicate that a duopoly of
type 2 performs worse in terms of market profit than type 3. This reconfirms that unlike
followers who follow up informative market signals in a type 3 duopoly, leaders with VBC in
a type 2 duopoly are not guided by market discipline. Because leaders stick to biased cost
information market performance is much lower in a type 2 duopoly.
DISCUSSION
The overtone of recent research on the value of various cost systems in competitive
markets, has been the prevalence of market discipline (Briers et al. [1999], Cardinaels et al.
[2004], Waller et al. [1999]). It has often been suggested that decision makers will use
information in the market rather than using (fixating on) their cost report.  As a result, initial
differences in various cost report types would not persist (Waller et al. [1999]). By extending
previous research to a more realistic multi-period and interactive pricing duopoly, we propose
that the sensitivity to market signals cannot be generalized as far as prior work has suggested.
Our results indicate that agents acting as leaders, even those using biased volume based
costing (VBC), tend to ignore opportunities to learn from better informed rivals. Rather than
observing market discipline, they predominantly fixate on cost reports. Because of this
fixation, leaders with VBC are even outperformed by rivals using ABC. Conversely,
followers are more effective in screening market feedback. Cost system choice is unimportant
when they face rivals that use ABC, but their own cost report matters when leaders use biased
cost data.
Apparently, the finding that market feedback may not always help to alleviate cost
system fixation bias has practical implications for cost system design. If learning from market
feedback is interfered with by the mere belief that one’s firm is a reputational leader, there
must be many real life business contexts in which managers rely too often and too much on
their own cost data. The practical implication is that adopting more refined costing systems,
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like ABC, can benefit many firms (Cooper and Kaplan [1998]), as their cost fixation bias may
otherwise lead to being outperformed in the market. Worth mentioning is that supplementary
analyses on market performance of the dynamic interplay stress other importance aspects of
more refined cost systems in competitive settings. Market performance is hard to improve via
simple outcome feedback, if both parties rely on VBC. At least one of the parties should use
ABC, but still performance is lower when followers rather than leaders have access to the
more accurate data, due to a leader’s failure to follow market discipline.
We attribute our findings to reputational leaders being more prone to reference group
neglect. Unlike Camerer and Lovallo [1999] were the phenomena occurred when the task
explicitly suggested that own actions would be important, we show that without explicitly
labeling which data are important, ‘reputational’ leaders spontaneously fixate on their own
cost system, even if it produces biased cost data. Reference group neglect is typically
observed in competitive settings and is related to managerial overconfidence in other studies
(Alba and Hutchinson [2000]; Nelson, Krische, and Bloomfield [2003]), but there are
differences as suggested by Camerer and Lovallo [1999]. While leaders in our setting
indicated to ignore market feedback, Camerer and Lovallo [1999] suggest that more confident
agents would not neglect competition, but would prefer the own cost system anyway because
of strong beliefs in their own abilities. Nevertheless, we believe that the difference is subtle in
competitive settings. We therefore suggest follow up research using individual decision or
prediction tasks. We see applications in the recent studies testing whether subjects can debias
distorted cost information when their own system would also provide other types of feedback
such as objective market trends, historical data, informal cost estimates. (Dearman and Shields
[2001], Bruns and McKinnon [1993], Malmi [1997]). A highly confident agent may be less
effective in updating cost system bias as he may not appropriately weigh each type of
feedback.
We also highlight some limitations that may stimulate future research. Our setting has
only two market agents, in which the leader fixated on (even biased) cost data, while the
follower effectively screened market feedback. The question remains whether these results
extend to more competitive environments. With more market agents, it may be harder to
neglect important market data (Waller et al. [1999]). In contrast, more competitive settings
with a larger number of players create complexity, in which decision makers may exhibit even
more (irrational) behavior (Coughlan and Mantrala [1992], Roth and Ever [1995]). While
followers in our setting effectively screen market feedback, such screening may be difficult
under greater competition.
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While reputational leadership is well dispersed and typically occurs in competitive
settings (Sherer [1980]; Cooper [1996]), there are many other strategic considerations in a
competitive context (Hansen, 1998) that can further be examined. Via similar underlying cost
functions we explicitly focused on reputational leadership, but one can also test if firms can
use ABC for managing cost reduction initiatives to achieve cost leadership in a particular
market. Our study also assumed a design that excluded communication among participants. It
would be fascinating to study how cost systems can strategically be used to coordinate efforts
of different market agents to achieve higher profits over the long run than simply under a
competitive equilibrium. Finally, our participants could not choose their role but further work
can explore the fact of who will choose to lead. Reputational leaders in the long run may give
up a leading position when they continue to rely on biased cost data. ABC may then serve as a
prerequisite to maintain a leadership position. In any event, it is important that future
experiments that investigate these long-term strategic decisions maintain a focus on a multi-
period competitive adaptive play.
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APPENDIX A
This appendix shows how total actual costs incurred are allocated to the two market
segments using ABC or volume based costing. We only display the report for the leader, since
a report for the follower is similar. At the start of the experiment, the leader’s initial prices
were €1650 for market A and € 1710 for market B, while the follower responded with €1645
for segment A and €1706 for segment B.  Prices were clearly not in line with the cost of
serving (market A received a lower price while in fact it was more costly). Table A1 displays
the leader’s actual results at these initial prices, based on the functions of Table 1. Subjects
did not receive these actual figures. They only received the market report of table A1 with the
rival’s prices and his total profits but further had access to imperfect cost reports (see Table
A2 and A3).
Insert Table A1 About Here
For cost allocation, we assume that part of total actual cost (4452289, see shaded area
in Table A1) is in fact the cost of goods sold. Products are imported at a fixed price where the
import price for market B is slightly higher than that for market A:
Cost of goods sold = 630 * Qa + 710 * Qb = 630 * 2277.25 + 710 * 699.3 = 1931171
The remaining part of total actual cost incurred (4452289 – 1931171 = 2521118),
defined here as customer costs and is allocated to the two market segments using different
cost accounting systems. An ABC system uses a two-stage procedure to allocate this cost (see
panel A of Table A2). In the first stage, the system spreads the costs over three marketing
activities - ordering, delivery and software installation – on the basis of the time that each
activity consumes. In the second stage, the cost of each activity is allocated to the two
segments based on activity drivers. Panel B of table A2 displays the ABC report. Market A
incurs per unit more cost since it requires more activities (more orders, deliveries & custom
design) than market B. This corresponds with actual cost data where market A is also shown
as more costly (see Table A1).
Insert Table A2 About Here
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Under volume-based costing (VBC, Table A3), customer costs are allocated to the two
market segments using sales volume as a driver. This driver is unable to differentiate between
the cost of servicing the two market segments. VBC produces a highly biased cost picture
when compared to actual unit cost s of Table A1. Market B is shown to be more costly than
market A while in fact it incurs per unit less cost.
Insert Table A3 About Here
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TABLE 1
Functions used in the experiment and game-theoretical equilibrium
Panel A: demand and cost functions and parameters per market segment (s = A, B)
Demand: Qis = us– vsPis+ wsPjs  (1) Cost: C(Qis) = fs + ys Qis + zsQis2  (2)
U V
W f y
Z
Segment A 5500 3.0 1.05 Segment A 1750000 220 0.14
Segment B 2325 1.05 0.3 Segment B 700000 195 195
Panel B: Game-theoretic equilibrium derived via backward induction (s = A, B)
* Profit Objective functions for leaders and followers:
  Profit leading firm: pis = Pis (us-vsPis + ws Pjs) - ys(us-vsPis + wsPjs) - zs(us-vsPis + wsPjs)2 -fs (3)
  Profit follower:       pjs = Pjs (us-vsPjs + ws Pis) - ys(us-vsPjs + wsPis) - zs(us-vsPjs + wsPis)2 -fs (4)
* Optimal reaction function for the follower (firm j) to prices of leader (firm i):
  Pjs = (2 usvszs + us + vsys ) + (2 vswszs + ws) Pis  (5)
2(vs + vs2 zs)
* Optimal strategy for the leading firm given the follower’s reaction function:
  Pis = ms - ns ys - 2 zs ms ns          ms  =   us + ws(2 usvszs + us + vsys)   and ns =   ws2(2vszs +1) - vs      (6)
2ns (zs ns - 1)    2(vs + vs2zs)                 2(vs + vs2zs)
* Optimal values via equations (3)-(6) using the parameters of panel A:
OPTIMA FOR THE LEADING FIRM OPTIMA FOR THE FOLLOWING FIRM
PRICE (6) PROFIT (3) PRICE (5) PROFIT (4)
Segment A 1848.2 428483.8 1834.4 439345.5
Segment B 1348.0 348732.0 1337.3 351652.5
Total profit - 777215.8 - 790998.0
a Demand is based on a typical demand function for differentiated products (v > w; there is no threat of losing all sales to a
rivals). Cost functions are similar for leaders and followers. Profit objective functions can be derived from equations and (1)
and (2). Game theoretical optima are found via backward induction and were verified by the solver function of a spreadsheet
program Details of the calculations can be provided on authors’ request. None of this information is revealed to participants.
Optima only serve as benchmarks for comparing performance of participants in the experiment.
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TABLE 2
The four different types of duopolies and their information structure
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Participant as a leader VBC (14) VBC (14) ABC (15) ABC (15)
Participant as a follower VBC (14) ABC (14) VBC (15) ABC (15)
a subjects either play the role of leader or follower (factor 1). Leaders decide before followers. After
setting prices feedback is issued via the participants’ own cost system (factor 2) either volume based
costing (VBC) or activity-based costing (ABC) and a market report (factor 3) with prices and total
profit of the rival (also using VBC or ABC). The number of subjects per cell is shown between
brackets.
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TABLE 3
Regression results of the three different models for the leader role – Hypothesis 1
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
OWN SYSTEM
C VBC      ‘OS’      ABC
O F 556752
647018
M E (43.7%) (27.8%)
P E
VBC
[35.7%] [25.7%]
E D {140} {150}
T B
‘CF’
570875 623186
I A (38.24%) (24.18%)
T C [32.3%] [21.0%]
O K
ABC
{140} {150}
R
Panel B: Parameter estimates and significance levels of the models (Yule-walker)
        Dependent variables        
Parameter estimates Realized p %dev_p %dev_P
Intercept       508239***       0.5371
***       0.4180
***
Own system (OS)         91532***     -0.1607***     -0.1017***
Competitor feedback (CF)           9815     -0.0570     -0.0346
OS*CF       -34442       0.0121     -0.0163
TRIAL (T)          8925***     -0.0173***     -0.0105***
R-square       0.3873***       0.5030
***       0.6687
***
a Cells in Panel A contain the mean of a leader’s realized profit, (the mean % deviation of a leader’s profit
from optimal profit given expectations of the follower playing optimal), [the mean % deviation of a leader’s
prices from optimal prices], {the number of trial/participants observations}. The graph shows the effect of the
feedback types on realized profit. Models in panel B test the effects of feedback received from the participant’s
cost system ‘OS’ (ABC or VBC), the feedback on prices and profits of their competitor ‘CF’ (either also using
ABC or VBC), the interaction ‘OS*CF’ and a learning effect represented by the trial number ‘T’ on the three
defined metrics of decision performance. Significance: * p<.10 level; ** p <.05 level; *** p < .01 level.
Leader
500000
520000
540000
560000
580000
600000
620000
640000
660000
TRAD ABCOS
CF=VBC
CF=ABC
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Follower
500000
520000
540000
560000
580000
600000
620000
640000
660000
TRAD ABCOS
CF=ABC
CF=VBC
TABLE 4
Regression results of the three different models for the follower role – Hypothesis 2
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
OWN SYSTEM
C VBC ABC
O F 533192 620027
M E VBC (47.2%) (32.9%)
P E [36.6%] [28.6%]
E D {140} {140}
T B 649401 655129
I A ABC (28.7%) (23.6%)
T C [26.7%] [20.5%]
O K {150} {150}
R
Panel B: Parameter estimates and significance levels of the models (Yule-walker)
        Dependent variables        
Parameter estimates Realized p %dev_p %dev_P
Intercept 478034*** 0.5759*** 0.4326***
Own system (OS) 95491*** -0.1662*** -0.0956***
Competitor feedback (CF) 112670*** -0.1797*** -0.0967***
OS*CF -86340** 0.1039** 0.0305
TRIAL (T) 9835*** -0.0176*** -0.0113***
R-square 0.4968*** 0.5682*** 0.6812***
a Cells in Panel A contain the mean of a follower’s realized profit, (the mean % deviation of a follower’s
profit from optimal profit given expectations of the leader playing optimal), [the mean % deviation of a
follower’s prices from optimal prices], {the number of trial/participants observations}. The graph shows the
effect of the feedback types on realized profit. Models in panel B test the effects of feedback received from the
participant’s cost system ‘OS’ (ABC or VBC), the feedback on prices and profits of their competitor ‘CF’ (either
also using ABC or VBC), the interaction ‘OS*CF’ and a learning effect represented by the trial number ‘T’ on
the three defined metrics of decision performance. Significance: * p<.10 level; ** p <.05 level; *** p < .01 level.
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TABLE 5
Performance of leaders compared to followers for each duopoly type –Hypothesis 3
Panel A: Autoregressive model per duopoly type: p = b0 + b1 Role + b2 trial + e  (test of H3)
Intercept 538531*** Intercept 538531***
Role -27610 Role 53157**
Trial 2061 Trial 15991***
Autoregressive
R2 0.26
Autoregressive
R2 0.53
Intercept 599178*** Intercept 558684***
Role -9292         Role 32617
Trial 9710*** Trial 11653***
Autoregressive
R2 0.42
Autoregressive
R2 0.47
Panel B: Additional analysis for the differences between duopoly types
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
L: VBC L: VBC L: ABC L: ABC
F: VBC F: ABC F: VBC F: ABC
Realized profit leader (a) 556752 570875 647018 623186
Realized profit follower (b) 533192 620027 649401 655129
Market performance (a)+(b)
Total Profit realized in market 1089944 1190903 1296420 1278315
0.0596 0.0548 0.9504
0.052
0.0232
a Panel A displays the mean performance of leaders against that of followers in each of the 10 trials. Results of the auto
regression (estimated via the Yule-walker procedure) to test for the effect of the role on decision performance and should be
seen as a direct test of H3. *, **, ***, respectively indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Panel B contains
additional analyses on the total market profit realized in each duopoly type. Pair wise comparisons indicate p-values of the
Kruskal-Wallis test for the differences in means.
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TABLE A1
Actual results for the leader and the competitor feedback at the start of the experiment
Actual results of the leader based on table 1 (not shown to participants)
segment A margin segment B margin Total margin
Price 1650 1710
(Price rival) (1645) (1706)
Sales volume 2277 699 2976
Revenue 3757463 1195803 4953266
Actual cost 3547463 94.4% 904826 75.7 % 4452289 89.9%
Profit 210000 5.6% 290977 24.3% 500977 10.1%
Cost/unit 1557.8 1293.9
Competitor feedback shown to participants
Price market A 1645
Price market B 1706
Total profit competitor 500639
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TABLE A2
Underlying assumptions in the ABC condition and the displayed ABC report
Panel A: assumptions of the ABC system (not shown to participants)
Stage 1: Allocating cost to
activities
Stage 2: Activity drivers for each market
segment
% of time Activity level per 100
units
Order processing 35 % Segment A Segment B
Software
installation
40 % No Orders 15 7
Delivery 25 % No licenses 230 120
No Deliveries 7 4
Panel B: initial ABC report issued to participants acting as leader
Market
A
margin Market B margin Total margin
Sales Volume 2277 699 2977
Price 1650 1710
Revenues 3757463 1195803 4953266
Cost of goods
sold
1434668 38.2% 496503 41.5% 1931171 39.0%
Customer Costs 2177171 57.9% 343947 28.8% 2521118 50.9%
Rate
# Cost # Cost # Cost
Order Proces.
2259
346 771190 49 110601 390 882391
Software install.
166
5238 869189 839 139258 6077 108447
Delivery
3364
160 536191 28 94088 187 630279
Profits 145624 3.9% 355353 29.7% 500977 10.1%
Unit Costs 1586.1 1201.8
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TABLE A3
Initial traditional cost report issued to the participants acting as leader
Segment
A
Margin Segment
B
Margin Total Margin
Sales Volume 2277 699 2977
Price 1650 1710
Revenues 3757463 1195803 4953266
Cost of goods sold 1434668 38.2% 496503 41.5% 1931171 39.0%
Customer Costs 1928815 51.3% 592302 49.5% 2521118 50.9%
Profits 393980 10.5% 106998 8.9% 500977 10.1%
Unit Costs 1477.0 1557.0
